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Atlantic Trade  Relations:  Flashpoint  1980 
I  want  today to talk about  trade  and  its place  in US/EEC  relations. 
Trade has not al  vJays  been thought  important. 
British Ambassador  in St.  Petersburg before  1914. 
Those days  gone  for ever. 
Exports now  account for one  job in five  in Community;  for  one 
job  in ten in the United States. 
Together 
trade. 
the US  and  the  EEC  account  for one-third of world 
All this adds up to a  major interest  on  both sides  of the Atlantic 
in the massive trade betl-.'een  us  and  in our  joint responsibility for 
the  open  world trading system which has been mainly responsible 
over the  last  30  years for the biggest  increase  in world prosperity 
in recorded history. 
So trade matters not  just to economists  or trade negotiators but 
to farmers  and factory  workers  and politicians. 
What  is the outlook? 
The  answer is not  encouraging. 
The  macro  problems  are  well known;  we  spent  some  time  on  them 
yesterday. Inflation:  the  return of two-digit  inflation rates in several 
industrialised countries and the  reversal  of the  downward  price 
trend in others represented in the first half of this year a 
major policy setback. 
Signs that  in the UK  and  the US  at  least  inflation is moderating 
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but  inflation at  or near  2o%  in any major area of the free  industrialised 
world  a  grizzly prospect. 
Unemployment:  unemployment  rising;business  confidence  shaken. 
Dismal  state of automobile  and  construction industries in·the 
United States. 
Overshadowing all this of course the  impact  of oil price  shocks 
Wave  of further oil price increases following the ¢2• per barrel rise 
announced by Saudi Arabia on May  15  and  ending with the  OPEC  agreement 
in Algiers  on  11  June. 
For the  1980s  as  a  whole this implies for the  Community,and  assuming 
no  further price increases,  average price of imported oil will be 
of the order of  32¢5  as  opposed to the  30¢4  assumed  in May  and that 
the average price next year would  be  37¢4  as  opposed to  34¢5 underlined 
in our previous forecast. 
This means  a  reduction in estimated  GDP  gro~~h in the  Community  by 
some  0.1  and 0.3 percentage points in  1980  and  1981  respectivel  • 
To  this must  be  added  the effect  of the US  recession. 
Drop  in US  output  in second quarter of 1980 now  seems  much  steeper 
than  we  previously estimated. 
On  the basis of international multiplier effects,  impact  of a  1% 
shortfall in US  growth rate  on  Community  GDP  is marginal  - of 
the order of one  decimal point - but  effect may  be more  serious 
if it contributes to a  world-wide  recession psychosis  among 
consumers  and  investors. 3
Looking further ahead,  two  main  problems with  which  the  world 
economy  will have  to  cope  are both  connected with energy. 
(a) Serious  concern about  the behaviour of energy prices or more 
specifically about  supply prospects will  continue to  impede 
investment  plar~ing;  this is one  of the  important  factors 
explaining the  low  level of gross fixed  investment  in the 
second half of the  seventies. 
To  this must  be  added the difficulty for either governments  or 
private firms to plan efficiently to adjust to changes  in the 
energy market  when  rapid inflation is making all energy prices 
both present  and  future highly uncertain. 
(b)  The  recycling of the new  surplus  of the major oil exporting 
countries - over 100  billion dollars this year. 
In real terms  comparable  in magnitude to the  surplus in  1974. 
But  while this surplus was  drawn dovm  much  faster than most 
observers then expected,  several facilitating circumstances: 
Imports  into the  OPEC  countries grew very rapidly in the first 
four years;  rapid  inflation reduced the real size of the 
surplus and it was  denominated  in US  dollars which  depreciated 
between  1973  and  1979. 
By  the  end  of the  1970s,  however,  the  import  capacity of the 
major oil exporting countries became  strained - the volume  of their 
imports declining in absolute terms  in  1979. 
1-Jhile  the growth  of OPEC  countries \vill no doubt  be  resumed,  the 
size of the  OPEC  surplus  in real terms  is likely to be more 
strongly defended both by  OPEC  price supply policies and  perhaps 
by a  slower import  gro~~h than in the first years after 1973. 4
PARTICULAR 
PROBLEMS 
Indeed the recycling problem may  initially take the  form  of a 
limited number  of countries either defaulting on  international 
loans  or having to cut back  on  imports  due  to foreign  exchange 
shortages. 
Some  developing countries in deep trouble already. 
Implications of all this for Community  and US  exports  and  growth 
if this happens  on  a  limited scale will be minimal. 
But  such developments  could  easily snowball  as  international 
financial  institutions refused to renegotiate  loans  and  as risk 
premia became  unacceptably high to such  an  extent  that  v1orld 
trade  was  significantly affected. 
This is a  sombre  state of affairs and  a  sombre  outlook. 
It means  a  remorselessly rising tide of protectionism  on  both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
Steel, textiles,  automobiles. 
Protectionism,  we  could agree,  solves nothing - it delays the 
adjustment  process  and  can mean  more  unemployment  in the  long run. 
But  not  easy to sell the doctrines of Adam  Smith to an unemployed  steel 
v1orker  in Pittsburgh or an unemployed textile worker  in Lille. 
So  much  for the general  scene. 
What  of the particular problems  facing trade across the Atlantic? 
Make  no  apology for going into some  of these areas  even if briefly. 5 If the gloomier  commentators  are talking about  an August  1914  situaticn 
for world trade,  we  might  as well know  where  the new  Sarajevo is 
going to be. 
First, steel 
Community  exports of steel to the US  totalled last year some  5t million 
tonnes,worth some  two billion dollars. 
And  the result  of an anti dumping suit brought  earlier this year by 
the US  Steel Corporation it is possible that the  Commerce  Department 
,  may  in October  judge that  our sales have been  at  less than market 
value. 
If that were to happen  liquidation of  customs entries would  be 
suspended. 
And  in the present  ~Tetched state of the steel market  and  indeed  in 
anticipation of this our exports  could  simply dry up  as early as 
this month. 
We  cannot  afford to add  two billion dollars to an existing trade 
deficit with the US  of thirteen, nor can the European steel 
industry afford to lose  a  market  for up to 5t million tonnes. 
So,much depends  on  action by the US  Government  which  could  induce 
US  Steel to withdraw their anti dumping suit. 
Automobiles 
The  U.A.W.  brought  in a  case  last month  for escape  clause action 
under the US  Trade  Act  against  imports  of foreign  cars. 
The  ITC  will report  in November  on  this complaint but  growing political 6
pressure for restraint  on  automobile  imports  and all this clearly 
has  implications not  just for US  imports  of cars from  Japan but 
for our  imports of cars from  Japan.  Because the European  car 
industry has not been silent on  the matter either. 
Then,  synthetic fibres 
In February this year the  Commission  authorised  Community  measures 
permitting the UK  to restrict by quota imports  from  the US  of 
polyester filament  yarn and  nylon  carpet yarn. 
We  have  since been engaged in discussion with the US  about the 
compensation which they have  claimed under Article XIX  of the  GATT. 
We  have not yet  reached agreement. 
If we  do not by the time the GATT  time  limit runs  out  on  July  20 
then an escalating series of withdrawals  of concessions  on  both 
sides could follow which  would  go  some  way  to unravel  the results 
of the  Tokyo  Round. 
And  linked with synthetic fibres is the problem  of competitive 
advantage US  producers  enjoy because of low  oil and  natural gas 
prices. 
He  are both engaged in consultations in the  GATT  on  this. 
But  the problem  could easily escalate massively into the petrochemical 
field;  there are already rumblings  of alarm  from  the European 
chemical  industry. 
These  are  some  but  not all of the problems  between the United States 
and  the  Community. 
Aqvone  of them,  if mishandled,  could prove  a  flashpoint  at  a  time 
when  the world trade  scene is littered  w~th high-quality,  10o%  dry 
tinder. -----------------·---------------
And  of course  our problems are not  limited to trade between us, 
massive that this is. 
We  both face problems  in trade with Japan. 
The  essential·  of the problem well known  to us both. 
We  analysed it for our part in a  Commission  document  which  was 
circulated widely in the press last year. 
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But  whatever additional efforts our businessmen may  make  the 
problems  of limited accessibility to the Japanese market,  the 
major trade deficit  we  have bilaterally with Japan,  coupled with 
the difficulty of adjusting to competition at  a  rate greater than 
that which  is politically and  socially tolerable - these problems 
remain. 
We  hope  to embark  on  a  new  strategy - to be discussed with our 
Ministers  in ten days  time - based  on  the reciprocal reduction of 
our remaining trade barriers. 
But  this will not be  an  easy process. 
And  what  either of us  do  in relation to Japan  immediately has 
major implications for the other. 
And  over a  good deal of world trade hangs  also the  problem  I 
mentioned earlier - will recycling the new  massive  OPEC  money  work 
or -vlill  there be  a  chain reaction of defaulting developing countries 
with the  shutters clanging down  on  c  world trade in a  manner 
reminiscent  of the  1930s  ? 8
CAN  THE  SYSTEM  HOLD? 
After some  moments  of gloom,  perhaps a  couple  of more  cheerful 
comments. 
What  is often forgotten in much  of the gloomy  comment  on  world 
trade and protectionism is one  fact; 
In the face  of the biggest  recession since the  1930s the world 
trading system bas held. 
At  the  end  of the Kennedy  Round  in  1967  the  then Director-General 
of the  GATT  said that this was  a  major achievement  but  one  which 
had been secured at  a  time  when,  to use the words  of President 
Kennedy,  "a rising tide was  lifting all boats". 
The  real test of the  GATT,  be  said,  would  come  when  the next 
recession came. 
The  next  recession has  come. 
But  with a  few  inroads here  and there - very few  battles are  won 
without  a  few  company  positions being lost - the  system has held. 
Indeed,  the  system not  only held: 
The  biggest trade negotiation in history - the  Tokyo  Round,  launched 
one  bright  autumn  day in Tokyo  in  1973  - was  successfully concluded 
last year. 
Due  in large part to  joint  leadership from  the United States and 
the  Community. 
Major trade liberalization programme  lasting over most  of the  1980s. 
Major new  departure  in codes  governing non tariff barriers. 9
Tightening up  the  GATT  as the  ry.le  of lar<  ensuring businessmen 
from  all countries a  square deal  in  world trade. 
Let  me  take  one  other example: 
That  relates to textiles. 
And  here  charges  of protectionism are much  bandied about,  particularly 
against the  Community. 
So,  let me  spend  a  minute  or so  on  this as another case study in 
relation to whether the  open  world trading system is holding. 
The  framework  in which  world textile trade is now  conducted  is the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement,  renewed  in  1977  for a  further four years. 
Much  has been made  of this so-called straitjacket and  the hardship 
it has  caused to the  exports of developing countries. 
But  to  judge this Arrangement  fairly  o~e has to go  back to its 
beginnings: 
These  were,to coin a  phrase,  in the historic compromise  constituted 
by the  Long  Term  Arrangement  on  Cotton Textiles first negotiated 
in Geneva  in  1962  after long and  arduous negotiation between 
developing country exporters  -;()f.  cotton textiles and  the major 
importing countries. 
With  it both importers and exporters  got  substantial benefits: 
Exporters from  the developing countries got  a  guarantee of an 
increase in their exports of at least  6%  per year and  a  secure 
framework  within  which  they  could plan their future production 
and trade. 10
Importing countries got  an  assurance that -imports  would  increase at 
a  pace moderate  enough  for the strains of running down  their 
textile industries and  of the necessary structural changes to be 
socially and  politically tolerable. 
In 1973  the  Long  Term  Arrangement  for Cotton Textiles became  the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement,  reflecting the basic fact  that it was  no 
longer practical to limit these arrangements to cotton textiles 
and  to exclude  synthetic fibres. 
During the first few years of this Arrangement  seeds of a  good  deal 
of later trouble were  sown: 
We  in the  Community  took  some  time to negotiate bilateral agreements 
with  our suppliers. 
The  US  moving  quickly negotiated  comprehensive  and tight  agreements 
with all their major suppliers - based in a  number  of cases  on 
previously negotiated agreements  which  already covered synthetic 
fibres. 
The  result  was  that  imports of textiles into the Community  in the 
years  1974-76  did not  just  remain at the  6%  provided for in the 
previous  decade  and  a  half. 
Imports  into the  Community  rose by  25%  per year. 
The  Community  became  the dumping  ground for world textiles. 
Imports  into the  Community  of textiles from  low-cost  suppliers 
between  1973  and  1976  rose by 61%;  into the US  and  Japan they 
fell by 41%  and 44%  respectively. 
Between  1973  and  1975  in fact  the Community  accounted for 7o%  of 
the  increase  in textile imports  into industrialized countries. 11
NEW  MECHANISMS 
All this lost us  in the  Community  nearly three-quarters of a 
million  jobs. 
So,  continuing the Arrangement  after 1977  was  an  achievement 
that  should not be under-estimated. 
Nor  should the fact that import  penetration for textiles in the 
Community  market,  still the  largest market  in the  world for 
developing country textiles,  remains at  3o%  - up to  6o%  for some 
products. 
A substantially higher figure  than other major importers. 
Renewing the Multi Fibre Arrangement  in 1981  will be  a  very major 
dispute between developed  and  developing countries. 
But  I  have  quoted this detail to show  that even  in one  of the 
most  sensitive areas of world trade,and under great pressure, 
solutions have been found - despite all the  charges  of protectionism 
- which  have  been more  liberal than would  have been thought 
possible  in the  immediate post-War years. 
So  here are  some  examples,  both general  and particular,  of how  the 
system has held. 
But  good  fortune  in the past does not  necessarily mean  success in 
the future. 
Are  the  me~hanisms for international consultation and  decision 
adequate to provide  a  bulwark  against  protectionist pressures? 
Let  us list some  of the main  mechanisms  now  available: (a) A series of non tariff barrier codes  agreed  in the  Tokyo  Round  -
ranging from  subsidies and  anti dumping to government  procurement 
and  customs valuation - represent  a  major strengthening of the 
international disciplines represented by the  GATT. 
Encouraging that these  codes  have  come  into effect  or are  coming 
into effect as scheduled;  a  major  investment  of time  and  effort 
will be needed to make  them  fully effective,  to develop  them  and 
to ensure  the participation of the maximum  number  of countries. 
Encouraging that this effort  seems  to be  forthcoming in Geneva 
from  all concerned. 
(b)  The  Consultative  Group  of  18  in the  GATT  - in effect  a  kind  of 
Steering Committee  - ;-:as  envisaged in the run-up to the  Tokyo 
Summit  last year as the central body for monitoring the MTN 
Agreements  and  for maintaining the  open  world trading system. 
This  group has now  been made  a  permanent  feature  of the  GATT  and 
plans to meet  ;-nth  senior trade policy makers  from  capitals two 
or three times  a  year. 
A meeting in the  spring of this year  showed  that this body is 
developing well to fulfil the role envisaged for it by  the  Tokyo 
Summit;  a  strengthened  GATT  Secretariat  later this year should 
also help. 
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(c)  The  opportunities offered by the  OECD  for consul  tat  ions beh;een 
the  industrialised countries  on  the interactions between trade  and 
economic  policy. POLICY 
(d)  The  hot  line relationship between Washington  and  Brussels which 
grew up  during the Tokyo  Round  and  continues today. 
(e)  Last  but very much  not  least,  the  annual meetings  of the seven 
major industrialised countries at  economic  summits. 
But  the  success with which  these mechanisms  can be used to maintain 
the  open  world trading system  of the post-'Har years depends  of 
course  on  the political will of the governments  of the major trading 
nations. 
And  here the declarations have  been firm  and the action forthcoming: 
In  London  in 1977  the Western Economic  Summit  declared itself 
"committed to providing strong political leadership for the global 
effort to expand opportunities for trade and to strengthen the 
open  international trading system". 
It asked for substantive progress that year in the  Tokyo  Round 
negotiations. 
In Bonn  in 1978  the Summit  noted  thea1bst~l progress made  in 
the  Tokyo  Round  and  charged their negotiators to conclude the 
operation. 
In Tokyo  in 1979  the Summit  noted the  agreements  reached  in the 
Tokyo  Round,  1.;relcomed  them  as  an  important  achievement  and  committed 
itself to their early and  faithful  implementation,and renewed  its 
determination to fight  protectionism and to strengthen the  GATT. 